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A B S T R A C T
This study examines smallholder farmers’ preferences for the uptake of contractual climate-smart agroforestry,
which yields economic and ecosystem benefits. A discrete choice experiment was conducted with smallholder
farmers in Ethiopia to elicit their willingness to participate in a payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme
that incentivizes integrating faidherbia albida (a fertilizer tree) in their mono-cropping farming system. Attributes
evaluated are “number of planted trees”, “payment amount”, “payment type”, and “contract period”. The pre-
sence of heterogeneity in the choice behavior of farmers warrants the use of the generalized multinomial logit
and latent class conditional logit models to allow for farmer- and class-specific preferences, respectively. The
results show that farmers derive higher utility from up-front payments. Farmers also strongly prefer food as the
mode of payment than cash. Moreover, low numbers of mandatory planted trees and short-term contracts are
found to be essential attributes that positively affect farmers’ decisions to take-up a contractual arrangement to
grow trees on their agricultural land. Our analysis also shows the presence of heterogeneity in preferences across
segments of farmers in conjunction with differences in household characteristics. These findings shed light on
the considerations that must be accounted for when designing and implementing environmental policies such as
PES schemes that promote large-scale adoption of climate-smart agroforestry, which would transform small-
holder agriculture into a sustainable farming system.
1. Introduction
Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) offers innovative possibilities for
developing countries not only to buffer their agricultural production
from the effects of climate shocks but also to orient agriculture as part
of the solution to the climate change challenge (Campbell et al., 2014).
The term CSA refers to a set of agricultural practices that can increase
resilience to weather extremes through its “triple wins” of sustainably
increasing agricultural productivity and incomes, adapting to climate
change, and removing or reducing greenhouse gas emissions (FAO,
2010). Climate-smart agroforestry is one such practice which involves
the integration of faidherbia albida (a fertilizer tree) into food crop
systems (Akinnifesi et al., 2010; Garrity et al., 2010; Sida et al., 2018;
Thierfelder et al., 2018). The practice comprises benefits associated
with yield increments, and ecosystem services such as; mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions, protecting biodiversity, and reducing land
degradation.
Climate-smart agroforestry improves soil structure and fertility, in-
creases cereal production by 50–400 percent, reduces production costs
by replacing around 75 percent of mineral fertilizers (Akinnifesi et al.,
2010), and sequesters up to 4 tons of carbon per hectare per year
(Mbow et al., 2014). Despite its economic and ecosystem benefits, the
uptake of climate-smart agroforestry by smallholder farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) remains far less than optimal (Garrity et al., 2010;
Glover et al., 2012). In the short run, tree planting in agricultural land
involves making expenditures to maintain the trees without yield and
financial returns as the production cycle is long. As a result, short-term
income losses often inhibit farming households from investing in cli-
mate-smart practices which generate long-term economic and en-
vironmental returns (Ndah et al., 2014; Neufeldt et al., 2011).
The standard policy intervention in the face of positive environ-
mental spillovers is to introduce incentives so that private individuals
benefit from the use of environmentally responsible practices (Martin
et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2015). Researchers and policymakers alike
have advocated payments for ecosystem services (PES) as an incentive-
based approach to internalizing the positive externalities of land use
decisions. The conceptualization of PES is based on creating markets for
trading ecosystem services, and correcting market failures that lead to
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their undersupply (Muradian et al., 2010). In a pure market-based PES,
the primary concern is the improvement of environmental outcomes
and not necessarily equity (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2013; Pagiola et al.,
2005). Hence, such PES programs are more suitable for well-off farmers
with well-defined property rights, low transaction costs, and better
resource endowment (Bremer et al., 2014; Lansing, 2017; Sierra and
Russman, 2006).
However, the poor and vulnerable farming households should be
targeted as their inclusion will ensure sustainable land use and the
Pareto-efficient provision of ecosystem services (Börner et al., 2017;
Reed et al., 2015). If payments are set to reflect opportunity costs for
ecosystem service providers, poor households, who have lower oppor-
tunity costs in absolute terms, would be the main beneficiaries of PES
schemes (Muradian et al., 2010). Hence, the design and implementation
of sustainable PES schemes that benefit the poor and vulnerable
farming households should be guided by both efficiency and equity
objectives (Leimona et al., 2015). To that end, the first step should
involve understanding which attributes of a PES scheme influence the
participation of poor farmers in the program. Eliciting farmers’ stated
preferences would uncover how they value the attributes of a proposed
PES contract before launching the program. So far, a considerable
amount of studies that elicit stated preferences have been conducted to
understand the various natural, social and economic factors that de-
termine participation in conservation- and restoration-oriented eco-
system service provision mainly via land retirement (i.e. the land
should not be primarily used for farming activities).1
In the context of SSA, the exclusive planting of trees on private
agricultural lands contradicts with the region’s policy agenda which
aim to increase agricultural production to feed the growing population.
Climate-smart agroforestry could solve this policy dilemma by in-
tegrating the welfare and ecosystem concerns on smallholders’ agri-
cultural land. However, few studies provide empirical evidence on the
willingness of smallholder farmers to intercrop trees which generate
multiple benefits for food security and the ecosystem. Notable examples
are the work by Porras (2010) who found that the number of small-
holder contracts has increased as a result of including agroforestry as a
category in PES schemes in Costa Rica. Jack (2010) also assessed al-
ternative market-based instruments for the efficient allocation of tree
planting contracts on the private lands of smallholder farmers in Ma-
lawi. Cranford and Mourato (2014) used a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) to examine farmers’ preferences for a reduction in the cost of
credit as a mode of payment for practicing agroforestry in Ecuador.
This paper examines farmers’ willingness to accept payments for
planting fertilizer trees on their agricultural land in Ethiopia. Although
the above-mentioned studies consider the eligibility of agroforestry
under PES financing mechanisms, as any conventional PES program,
the payment is ultimately attached to forest cover as a tradable eco-
system service. Put differently, farmers need to have the tradable
commodity – grown up trees on their farm plots – before claiming in-
centives for their services to the environment. This study departs from
the previous approach in that the hypothetical PES program rewards
farmers for adopting climate-smart agroforestry from the initial year of
planting the tree seedlings. Under this design, poor farmers can bear the
short-term costs associated with their investment in the practice. Hence,
this paper is a novel attempt at integrating efficiency and equity con-
cerns in a PES scheme that accommodates agroforestry in the context of
smallholder agriculture in SSA. A DCE is used to elicit farmers’ pre-
ferences toward a PES program that would make annual payments as
compensation for the direct and opportunity costs of investing in cli-
mate-smart agroforestry. In addition to the payment amount, the study
also evaluates the relative importance of three additional attributes:
required number of planted trees on the farm plots, payment type (cash
or food), and contract period in years. The study also examines the
socioeconomic factors that influence households’ decision to accept the
contractual tree planting arrangement or remain with their current
monocropping practice (the status quo).
We utilized a generalized multinomial logit (G-MNL) and latent
class conditional logit (LCL) models to examine variations in the choice
behavior of individuals and classes of farmers, respectively. The G-MNL
model accounts for both individual-specific scale and preference het-
erogeneity. All the G-MNL parameter estimates for the attributes con-
sidered in the PES program are statistically significant, an indication of
the relevance of the chosen attributes. We find that farmers derive
higher utility from up-front payments. Farmers are willing to receive a
low amount if the mode of payment is food rather than cash. Moreover,
low numbers of mandatory planted trees and short-term contract per-
iods significantly motivated the take up of contractual agroforestry. We
also find that farmers with a larger landholding and those who own a
television or radio have stronger preferences for the PES contract than
the status quo. The results from LCL model also show the presence of
heterogeneity in preferences across segments of farmers in conjunction
with differences in household characteristics. These findings provide
policy-relevant information on the design considerations that must be
taken into account for implementing PES contracts that promote
adoption of climate-smart agroforestry among farmers in SSA and
particularly in Ethiopia.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the relevance of climate-smart agroforestry in the context of
Ethiopia’s development strategy. Section 3 provides a theoretical fra-
mework that links the concepts of climate-smart agroforestry and PES.
Section 4 presents the source of data and data analysis techniques.
Section 5 and section 6 present the results and discussion of the study,
respectively. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Climate-smart agroforestry in the context of Ethiopia
Ethiopia has given top priority to the agricultural sector as the basis
for economic growth. However, the sector’s sensitivity to the vagaries
of weather and at the same time its contribution to climate change has
caused a major concern. Out of the total (150 Mt CO2e) national
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2010, 50% came from the pro-
duction of agricultural output and around 20% are driven by defor-
estation for agricultural land (FDRE, 2011). Furthermore, the agri-
culture sector would add around 110 Mt CO2e in GHG emissions by
2030 if Ethiopia pursues a conventional development path (ibid). The
conventional agricultural development path mainly involves the use of
additional natural and physical resources for intensifying agricultural
production, which would increase the carbon footprint as it has been
observed in other parts of the world.
Shifting away from the conventional path, Ethiopia has devised a
Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy that aims at over-
coming the challenges of developing a green economy. The CRGE
strategy is a blueprint to unleash Ethiopia’s potential for a sustainable
model of growth. Out of the four pillars that will support the strategy,
two of them are related to agriculture: (i) adoption of land productivity-
and efficiency-enhancing measures and (ii) increasing GHG sequestra-
tion in trees (i.e., planting trees for their economic and ecosystem
services). Therefore, the strategy attempts to orient agriculture in a
manner not only to significantly cut the contribution of the sector to the
national GHG emissions but also to use agricultural soils as a sink for
the emissions emanated from other sectors such as manufacturing and
transportation.
To that end, agroforestry offers a possibility for abatement of GHG
emissions by providing the greatest soil and above ground carbon se-
questration in tropical areas (Feliciano et al., 2018). The Agricultural
Extension Directorate of Ethiopia has given due emphasis for large-scale
promotion and adoption of faidherbia albida in the country. As part of
1 See Whittington and Pagiola (2012) for a review on the application of stated
preference methods for PES studies, and the stated preference-based PES studies
listed under a meta-analysis by Hjerpe et al. (2015).
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the activities outlined in the CRGE Strategy, in 2011, Ethiopia launched
a national program to plant over 100 million faidherbia albida trees in
the agricultural lands of smallholder farmers (Jirata et al., 2016). The
agroforestry practice using faidherbia albida has been promoted to ad-
dress issues of soil fertility, carbon sequestration, and resilience to cli-
mate variability. Integrating faidherbia albida trees in agricultural lands
in Ethiopia has been documented to improve soil water retention, ni-
trogen and phosphorus use efficiencies, and green cover during the off-
season (Sida et al., 2018). Despite Ethiopia’s ambitious output-based
target to reap the benefits from the large-scale adoption of climate-
smart agroforestry, it has not been clear how to facilitate farmers’
medium to long-term investment on the practice to realize the target.
3. Theoretical framework
Poor households that are at the bare minimum in their current
consumption cannot afford any decline in their current subsistence in-
come, and hence find it hard to invest on agricultural innovations that
do not provide immediate cash reward (Neufeldt et al., 2011). In the
spirit of the reference-dependent utility model of Köszegi and Rabin
(2006), the lack of uptake of agroforestry by smallholder farmers could
be explained by the overemphasis farmers give to the loss in utility as a
result of a decline in their reference (i.e. status quo) consumption level.
Based on that, the short-term overall utility is given by
= +u e r m e n e r( | ) ( ) ( | ), where m e( ) is the short-term consumption uti-
lity derived from planting faidherbia albida trees, and it is hardly dif-
ferent from zero. Whereas, n e r( | ) is the short-term utility loss due to
climate-smart agroforestry, and it is determined by considering the
foregone reference (status-quo) consumption level.
If a PES program compensates farmers for the direct and opportu-
nity costs of investing in tree planting on their agricultural land, the
disutility to farmers may be avoided and leave them indifferent be-
tween the status quo (i.e. mono-cropping) and adoption of climate-
smart agroforestry. Therefore, it is an imperative theoretical and em-
pirical inquiry to estimate farmers’ willingness to accept compensations
for short-term private losses emanating from conservation or restora-
tion-oriented land use decisions such as adopting climate-smart agro-
forestry. To this end, we present a model of farmers' willingness to
participate in a PES contract based on the agricultural household model
that is shown in Singh et al. (1986); de Janvry et al. (1991); and Taylor
and Adelman (2003).
3.1. Households’ utility maximizing consumption function
Due to market imperfections, quasi-universal circumstances in de-
veloping countries, farm households often act as a consuming (utility
maximizing) and producing (profit maximizing) agents as a result of the
non-separability between consumption and production decisions (Singh
et al., 1986). Farm households strive to maximize utility from con-
sumption of home-produced goods, marketed goods, and leisure.
Agricultural goods are produced through farm technology represented
by a production function.
=Q Q L O R( , , ¯) (1)
where =L T l¯ c is the labor used for the production of agricultural
outputs given as the difference between the total time endowment (T̄)
and labor consumed for leisure (lc). O is a vector of other variable inputs
such as mineral fertilizers. R̄ is land endowment which is assumed to be
fixed in the short-run. If the household is entirely subsistence, what is
produced is entirely consumed ( =C Qf ). But usually farming house-
holds in developing countries are semi-commercialized as they sell
marketable surplus M ( =M Q Cf ): the households are net sellers if
M > 0 and net buyers if M < 0. In this scenario, for farming house-
holds operating in a mono-cropping system, profits from agricultural
production can be derived as:i
= p M wL p Oy o (2)
where is profit in the mono-cropping system, py is the output price.
The general price level has a positive (negative) effect on the profit of
the net seller (net buyer) households. w is wage rate and po is a vector of
prices of the other variable inputs. Consequently, the utility maximizing
consumption level at the status quo – without agroforestry – is de-
termined by:
=C C C* ( , )f (3)
The introduction of agroforestry involves streams of added costs and
reduced returns that affect the households’ profit and ultimately their
utility maximizing consumption. The profit in the case of agroforestry
would be:
= Ie (4)
where e is profit in agroforestry, I is the present value of the total
investment expenditure on agroforestry and it can be extended as:
= + + +I wl E p Q r( ¯ )(1 )e y g t1 (5)
where le is the labor utilized for agroforestry; Ē is expenditures on
materials and equipment; =Q Q F( ¯)g is foregone food crop production
as a result of land taken away by agroforestry where F̄ is number of
planted trees; r is time preference (discount factor); t is number of years
households are making expenditures on climate-smart agroforestry
before getting positive economic gain attributable to the practice.
Analogous to Eq. (3), in the short-run, the utility maximizing con-
sumption in the climate-smart agroforestry system is:
=C C C* ( , )e f e (6)
3.2. Modeling WTA and participation in PES contract
The measure of farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) compensation
for renouncing their status quo utility maximizing consumption can be
computed in Eq. (7) as:
= = = =C C C C C C IWTA [ * ( , )] [ * ( , )]f e f e (7)
The farmer is assumed to participate in the PES contract only if the
contract payment offer is greater than or equal to WTA. Moreover, the
design considerations for PES schemes go beyond the amount of pay-
ment, which is a function of output price, wage, and discount factor. Eq.
(5) shows that WTA (i.e, I) is also a function of the number of trees
planted in the farm, and time (number of years that expenditures are
made before realizing financial benefits). Since farm investment deci-
sions are determined by consumption and production characteristics,
WTA is also very likely to be affected by variables that affect production
and consumption preferences. Therefore, farmers’ willingness to parti-
cipate in PES contracts (or accept compensation for foregoing the status
quo) and their preferences for climate-smart agroforestry will be a
function of household characteristics. For instance, access to available
information influences an individual’s knowledge, attitude, and per-
ception, which are the main drivers of choice decision (Aryal et al.,
2009). Moreover, farm income and wealth of the household are also the
major determinants of the households’ willingness to participate in PES
programs (Katrina and Andreas, 2012; Li et al., 2017) and risk and time
preferences (Tanaka et al., 2010). The following generalized model,
which leads to our empirical model specification in Section 4.3, pre-
sents farmers’ willingness to participate in a PES program that rewards
climate-smart agroforestry.
= + + +V X Zi i i i (8)
whereVi is the probability that the ith (i = 1, 2, …, n) household will
participate in the PES contract (intercrop fertilizer trees) given a vector
of PES attributes (X ). Z is a vector of farm and farmer characteristics
that are important determinants of preferences and i is the random
K.K. Haile, et al. Ecosystem Services 39 (2019) 100964
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term. , and are parameters to be estimated using the appropriate
choice analysis technique.
4. Methodology
4.1. Description of the study area
The study was conducted in Hintalo Wajirat district which is one of
the 34 rural districts of Tigray regional state in Northern Ethiopia
(Appendix Fig. 1). The study district is located South-East of Mekele,
the capital city of Tigray region, with GPS coordinates 13° 09′ 60.00″ N
and 39° 39′ 59.99″ E. The district has a total area of 193,309 hectares of
land and with an estimated total population of 170,243, out of which,
50.8 percent are females (CSA, 2013). Rainfed mixed crop-livestock
farming is the primary source of livelihood in the district. Extreme
environmental degradations in terms of soil erosion, loss of general
biodiversity, and desertification have occurred throughout the district.
In the past two decades, community-based conservation programs have
played a significant role in mobilizing human and financial resources
towards the construction of stone terraces, reforestation efforts, and
enforcement of grazing restrictions (Birhane et al., 2017). The current
policy priority of Tigray region in general and Hintalo-Wajirat district
in particular is to showcase for large-scale adoption of fadehrbia albida
which has been identified as a thriving agricultural innovation to en-
hance households’ food security and reduce their vulnerability to the
effects of climate change (Noulekoun et al., 2017; Rinaudo, 2010).
4.2. Source of data and method of data collection
Hintalo Wajirat district has a total of 22 tabias (kebeles),2 which we
could not cover them all in our survey due to financial and time con-
straints. We randomly selected seven tabias (Appendix Fig. 1) and
conducted a stated preference survey using a structured questionnaire
to administer face-to-face interviews, from January to mid-February
2017, with 200 randomly selected smallholder farmers. Our structured
questionnaire has sections to collect data on characteristics of the
household head, demographic and socioeconomic variables of the
household, and non-incentivized discrete choices on the adoption of
contractual climate-smart agroforestry. We recruited enumerators from
outside the study district and held a training session to build their
understanding of the contents of the stated preference survey ques-
tionnaire. Stated preference methods uncover how individuals value
different “alternatives” (whether goods, services, or courses of action)
in a survey context (Louviere et al., 2010). In contrast to revealed
preference methods using real-world data, stated preference studies are
a standard tool for assessing people’s preferences in hypothetical si-
tuations that do not currently exist, for instance before implementing a
new PES program.
Contingent valuation method (CVM) and discrete choice experiment
(DCE) are the two widely used approaches to elicit stated preferences
from individuals. The CVM is an interview technique where people are
asked to estimate the value they attach to certain alternatives directly.
As long as the respondents are convinced that their responses will be
used to help inform policy actions, the standard economic model sug-
gests that economic agents will respond to the survey expecting to
maximize their welfare (Carson, 2012). On the other hand, in DCE,
respondents make choices between cleverly designed alternatives to
estimate the weights that they place on each of the attributes that de-
fine the alternatives (Greiner et al., 2014). DCE has a sound theoretical
foundation in random utility theory, which hypothesized that in-
dividuals are rational decision makers maximizing utility relative to
their choices (McFadden, 1974).
The most common problems in stated preference methods are hy-
pothetical and strategic biases. In the former case, what people actually
do might not be the same as what they initially said they will do. Or, in
the case of the latter, they might deliberately overstate or understate
their true preferences to influence policy decisions that come out of the
study. To minimize the hypothetical and strategic biases which are
highly prevalent under the open-ended willingness to accept questions
of CVM (Adamowicz et al., 1998), this study employed DCE. Moreover,
“cheap talk” scripts have been common features of stated preference
studies to minimize biased responses (Carlsson et al., 2005; Cummings
and Taylor, 1999; Tonsor and Shupp, 2011). Accordingly, while
showing all sample farmers photos of climate-smart agroforestry that
are depicted in Appendix Fig. 2, a “cheap talk” script (presented under
the figure) was read to enlighten them about the choices that they are
requested to make and facilitate honest responses.
4.3. Design of the discrete choice experiment
The DCE design is generated following many sequential steps. The
first step involves the decisions related to the selection of attributes, and
attribute levels (Greiner et al., 2014). The attributes and their levels are
determined based on the literature on agroforestry, and consultations
with agricultural extension and natural resource management experts
in the study area. Except for the attribute levels of the “payment
amount”, the other attributes along with their levels are identified
based on the existing literature on PES and agroforestry. For optimal
climate-smart agroforestry, the common practice is planting one hun-
dred faidherbia albida tree seedlings per hectare with spacing at
10 × 10 m (Fagg, 1995) and can be thinned down to 20–30 trees per
hectare as the trees fully mature (Kang and Akinnifesi, 2000).
The “contract period” has levels that reflect the number of years
farmers receive payments from the PES program. The levels are set
based on the number of years farmers may wait before realizing positive
net returns from their investments on climate-smart agroforestry.
According to Baumer (1983), it will take at least 3–5 years after
planting to see early signs of improvements in crop productivity that
could be attributed to the presence of faidherbia albida trees in the farm
plots. In most usual cases, it might take 10 years and above before
farmers exploit the full economic benefits from climate-smart agrofor-
estry (Akinnifesi et al., 2010). The classification of the “payment type”
into cash or food is based on the argument that in the absence of
complete product markets, under which poor smallholder farmers
usually operate, the two modes of payments are distinct since one
cannot readily be converted to the other (Currie and Gahvari, 2008).
Setting the levels for the “payment amount” requires the con-
sideration of the direct and opportunity costs of climate-smart agro-
forestry. To this end, we conducted a private interview and field visits
with 12 (6 crop production and 6 natural resource management) ex-
perts in the study area to identify the added financial costs and the
reduced financial gains associated with planting 100 faidherbia albida
trees per hectare on the lands of smallholder farmers. The direct costs
include annual hired labor cost for planting and managing the trees in
farm plots, costs for fencing the seedlings to avoid damage by humans
or animals, and cost for the purchase of a pruning tool to remove da-
maged branches to protect the well-being of the trees.
We also considered the loss in farm income (the opportunity cost)
due to planting trees on agricultural land. The experts estimated the
area that 100 grown up faidherbia albida trees aging 10 years would
take – which is the area of the trunk size. Based on each expert’s re-
sponse, we then calculated the income loss to farmers as a result of
giving up the area that would have specifically been utilized for the
production of wheat, which is predominantly grown in the study area.
Therefore, the levels of the “payment amount” are non-conservative
estimates, and determined considering four scenarios of the responses
of the experts; (i) the minimum income loss estimate (ii) the median
income loss estimates (iii) the mean income loss estimates, and (iv) the
2 Tabia (kebele), which comprises villages, is the smallest administrative unit
in Ethiopian federal government structure.
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maximum income loss estimate. Table 1 presents the description and
coding of the attributes, and the levels attached to each attribute. The
attribute levels for the “payment amount” and “number of planted
trees” are converted on the basis of timad3 (local land area unit mea-
sure).
Once the attributes and their levels have been determined, the
second step is to combine them into alternatives which ultimately form
the complete choice sets. The number of possible combinations of at-
tribute levels, which is called the full factorial design, is very large
(4 × 4 × 2 × 3 = 96). These can be combined into 4560 pairs of al-
ternatives [(96 × 95)/2 = 4560], which is too many to be practically
feasible. Hence, the final fundamental step is combining the attribute
levels into alternatives and choice sets in such a way so as to design a
good DCE. A good DCE design is one that facilitates precision in the
estimation of the attributes and that avoids problems prominent with
revealed preference data, such as multicollinearity and limited varia-
tion in key variables (Johnson et al., 2013; Lancsar et al., 2017).
Efficient design and orthogonal design are the two competing ex-
perimental design generation procedures. A design is orthogonal when
the attribute levels of the different alternatives are uncorrelated in the
choice sets (Louviere et al., 2000). In recent years, efficient design is
becoming more prevalent as an alternative procedure with new algo-
rithms to facilitate the design. Efficiency is a measure of the level of
precision in which the parameter estimates on the attributes are mea-
sured (Johnson et al., 2013). Efficient designs have been empirically
shown to lead to smaller standard errors in model estimation at smaller
sample sizes compared to orthogonal designs (Rose and Bliemer, 2013).
This is a distinct advantage for this study given the small sample size.
The most commonly used efficiency measure is D-efficiency which leads
to the smallest generalized variances of the parameter estimates
(Louviere et al., 2008). For this study, during the design of a D-efficient
DCE, the main considerations taken into account are; the number of
blocks which comprise the total choice sets, the number of choice sets
under each block, and the number of alternatives under each choice set.
A choice set with a large number of alternatives increases the cog-
nitive burden on the respondents. A 3-alternative design is adopted in
this study involving a choice between two hypothetical PES contracts
and “neither of the two” (the status quo) option, which reflects the
voluntary nature of farmers’ participation in a PES scheme. This re-
search applies the ‘pick-one’ format to better resemble real-life decision
making. The number of choice sets that need to be included depends on
the number of parameters to be estimated in the econometric model. In
this study, there are 4 attributes and 8 household characteristics.
Following the formula by Rose and Bliemer (2013), the required
number of the choice sets for the DCE design are computed as; [12/
(3–1) = 6]. Therefore, at least 6 choice sets should be presented to each
respondent to generate the statistical minimum data points for the es-
timation of the parameters. This study went beyond the statistical
minimum by setting 8 choice sets (see Table 2 for a sample choice set),
after randomly dividing 16 choice sets into two blocks. After com-
pleting the DCE survey and excluding 6 sample households for in-
complete responses in the choice experiment, the analysis is conducted
based on a total of 4656 valid unlabelled discrete choices that are
nested within 194 respondent farmers.
4.4. Methods of data analysis
4.4.1. Empirical models specification
The analysis of DCE data relies on the framework provided by
random utility theory where the choice problem is a problem of max-
imization of a utility function while the choices are observable in-
dicators of utility. The conditional logit model (CLM), which is an ex-
tension of the multinomial logit model, developed by McFadden (1974)
has been the workhorse econometric tool for analyzing discrete choice
data. Accordingly, the utility that a farmer derives is given by Eq. (9) as:
= + = = =Ui V i N j J t T; 1, 2, ..., ; 1, 2, ..., ; 1, 2, ...,jt ijt ijt (9)
where Uijt is the unobservable, but true utility for farmer i derived from
choosing alternative j in a choice set t. Relying on Eq. (8) in Section 3.2,
Vijt is the observable or systematic component of the overall utility of
farmer i choosing alternative j in the choice set t, and ijt is the random
component. The choice decision Vijt is a function of the observable at-
tributes of the alternatives in the choice sets and the observable char-
acteristics of the respondent that do not vary across the choice sets.
Hence, the specification for Vijt is:
= + +V X Zijt j ijt i (10)
where Xijt is a vector of observed attributes of alternative j and in choice
set t, Zi is the vector of socio-demographic characteristics of the farmer
i, ijt are disturbances assumed to be independently and identically
distributed. j are alternative specific constants (ASCs) which represent
a status quo intercept taking the value of 1 if farmers choose the status
quo, and 0 otherwise. is a vector of attribute-specific utility weights
(homogenous across respondents), and is a vector of parameters to be
estimated that are associated with household-specific characteristics
Table 1
Description of the attributes and attribute levels.
Attributes Description and coding of the attributes Attribute levels
Number of planted trees The number of required faidherbia albida trees per timad that need to be planted in the farm plots. 5, 10, 20, 25
Payment amount The annual payment in Ethiopian Birr (ETB).a The amount of payment considers the additional financial costs and the reduced
financial gains per timad associated with planting faidherbia albida trees in the farmers’ plots.
125, 135, 155, 190
Payment type A dummy variable for the payment type taking the value of 1 for food and 0 for cash. During the survey, the cash equivalent
quantities of wheat in kg are presented in the choice tasks.
Cash, Food
Contract period The total number of years farmers will be incentivized based on the number of existing faidherbia albida trees on their farm plots. 3, 5, 10
Note: a 1 ETB is 0.044 U.S. Dollar (USD) based on the survey period average official exchange rate, which is obtained from OANDA currency converter (http://www.
oanda.com/currency/converter).
Table 2
Sample DCE choice set.
Attributes Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Number of planted trees 10 25 Neither of the two (the
status quo)Payment amount (monetary
value)
125 155
Payment type Wheat1 Birr
Duration of the contract 5 years 3 years
Which option would you
choose?
1 In option 1, the D-efficient design results in the payment amount of 125
ETB with a payment type in food (wheat) along with the other two attribute
levels. The price for wheat during the survey period was 5 ETB per kg. Since the
majority of the respondents are illiterate, we made the conversion of the
monetary values into the actual amounts in the form of wheat (in option 1 for
instance, we told farmers 125 ETB value of wheat means 25 kg).
3 Timad is a local land area measuring unit which is more familiar to farmers
than hectare. In the study area, one timad is equivalent to 0.25 ha.
K.K. Haile, et al. Ecosystem Services 39 (2019) 100964
5
(Zi). Plugging Eq. (10) into Eq. (9) leads to the following specification.
= + + +U X Zijt j ijt i ijt (11)
where the elements in the specification of Eq. (11) are as described
in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10). While CLM represents a natural starting point
for estimating the parameters in Eq. (11), it imposes the unrealistic
condition known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA),
which states that the relative probabilities of two options being chosen
are unaffected by the introduction or removal of other alternatives
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984; Hensher and Greene, 2003). Hence,
CLM cannot account for preference heterogeneity among respondents
(or that their preferences depend only on observable characteristics).
Moreover, CLM also restricts the percentage change in the probability
for one alternative given a percentage change in the mth attribute of
another alternative to remain the same (Hensher and Greene, 2003). If
the IIA property is violated, CLM will result in biased parameter esti-
mates.
In modeling individuals’ choice, unobserved heterogeneity is per-
vasive and differential substitution patterns are likely to exist. The
mixed logit (MIXL) model eliminates the limitations of the standard
CLM by allowing the parameters in the model to vary across re-
spondents. The basic structure of the specification under MIXL model
remains identical to Eq. (11), but instead of , a vector of individual-
specific coefficients i is estimated (Hensher and Greene, 2003;
McFadden and Train, 2000; Train, 2009). Such that = +i i, where
i is a random vector distributed MVN (0,Σ) and captures preference
heterogeneity across respondents (Fiebig et al., 2010). However, a new
strand of literature arise arguing that much of the preference hetero-
geneity may be better described as scale heterogeneity (SH) where are
fixed but the only variation between respondents is the scale of the
idiosyncratic error term (Louviere et al., 2008). Building up from Eq.
(11) after justifying scale heterogeneity as the source of variation in the
attribute parameters, the estimation of i is =i i , where i is a re-
spondent-specific scale of the idiosyncratic error heterogeneity, dis-
tributed lognormal with standard deviation and mean + Zi
__
(Fiebig
et al., 2010).
To accommodate both preference and scale heterogeneity, (Fiebig
et al., 2010) developed a generalized multinomial logit (G-MNL) model
that provides an appealing and tractable way to describe both types of
heterogeneity with a single equation as = + +{ (1 )}i i i i,
where is a scalar parameter, and i and i are as described above.
Estimating G-MNL without imposing a constraint on allows more
flexibility in how preference and scale heterogeneities are combined
(Keane and Wasi, 2013). However, this will increase the required
number of data points for the estimation (Lancsar et al., 2017). Since
the sample size of this study is relatively small, we constrained = 0
resulting in the type II generalized multinomial logit model (G-MNL-II)
(Fiebig et al., 2010), which is also known as scaled MIXL model (Greene
and Hensher, 2010). Based on this model, the utility to farmer i from
choosing alternative j in choice set t is given by:
= + + + +U X Z( )ijt j ijt i i i ijt (12)
The G-MNL model in Eq. (12) nests CL, MIXL, and SH models. When
i = 1 and var( i) = 0, the G-MNL specification revert back to CLM.
When i = 1, the estimation will be MIXL model. When var( i) = 0, the
specification becomes the SH model. Moreover, in the estimation stage,
the attributes (Xijt) could be allowed to freely correlate with each other.
The latent class conditional logit (LCL) model was also employed to
account for heterogeneity in preferences of groups of farmers. In LCL,
farmers are sorted into a discrete number of latent classes (C) and
distinctive taste parameters are estimated for each class, = ( 1, …,
c), which are heterogeneous across classes but homogeneous within a
class (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). Following Greene and Hensher
(2003), the LCL model is specified in Eq. (13) by taking a logit model as
the central behavioral model where the choice probability that a farmer
i (i = 1, … , N) of class c chooses alternative j (j = 1, … , J) from choice
set t (t= 1, … , T) as:
= = = = = …
=
choice j class c
x
x
c CPr( | ) Pr
exp( )
exp( )
1, ,it it c c
itj
k
J
c itk
|
1 (13)
where c is a vector of class-specific utility parameters associated with
the vector of attributes xitj. Given the class membership status is un-
known, the unconditional likelihood of choices of farmer i needs to be
specified. Following Pacifico and Yoo (2013), the sample log-likelihood
is then obtained by summing each respondent’s log unconditional
likelihood as shown in Eq. (14).
=
= = =
Lln ( , ) ln ( ) Pr
i
N
c
C
ic
t
T
it c
1 1 1
|
(14)
where ( )ic is the weight for class c. and can be more conveniently
estimated via a well-known Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
for likelihood maximization in the absence of information on each
agent’s class membership status (Pacifico and Yoo, 2013). An issue to be
noted is the choice of the number of classes. To decide the optimal
number of classes, we used the value of C that minimizes the measures
of variants of information criteria methods (Louviere et al., 2000).
4.4.2. Estimating marginal willingness to accept
The WTA measure for an attribute corresponds to a compensatory
payment that farmers, on average, would be willing to accept to make a
one-unit improvement in the attribute level (or to adopt a category of
an attribute) in the case of negative values and to give up in the case of
positive values. WTA measures on the attributes provide a convenient
way for comparing the marginal utility weights that respondents assign
to the attributes. Calculating WTA measures could follow estimation
either in the preference space or in the WTA space. In the former, a
distribution of coefficients in the utility function is specified and then a
distribution of the WTA is later derived. This study follows the standard
approach which assumes that attribute coefficients are normally dis-
tributed and the payment coefficient is fixed to compute the WTA as the
ratio of the coefficients for non-payment attributes ( A) to the negative
of the payment attribute coefficient ( P), such that:
=WTAA A
P (15)
The main problem with fixing the distribution of the payment
coefficient while estimating the WTA in the preference space (Eq. (15))
is that all individuals are assumed to have the same marginal utility of
income (Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006), and variation in scale would be
erroneously translated into variation in WTA resulting in untenably
large WTA measures (Train and Weeks, 2005). To solve the problem of
artifact measures, Train and Weeks (2005) recommend computing
reasonable WTA estimates directly in the WTA space as presented in Eq.
(16). Accordingly, we applied maximum simulated likelihood after re-
formulating the model in such a way that the distributional assumptions
are made directly on the WTA measures.
= + +U P x( )ijt i ijt i ijt ijt (16)
where Uijt is as described under Eq. (9), Pijt is the payment attribute, xijt
is non-payment attributes, = /i Pi i, = c /i i i, =c /i Ai i and ijt is the
disturbance term distributed with variance given by ( /6)i2 2 . is scale
of the idiosyncratic error heterogeneity. A is a vector of parameter
estimates of non-payment attributes to be estimated on WTA space.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
This study hypothesizes that the household characteristics, parti-
cularly those (closely) related to farmers’ perception on climate-smart
agroforestry, income or wealth, and access to information can influence
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their preferences to participate in a PES program that promotes ferti-
lizer tree planting (see Section 3.2). Table 3 presents the household
level variables that are included in the analyses. Namely, these vari-
ables are: gender, age, and educational status of the household head;
family size; total land holding; access to agricultural extension services;
membership to informal information sharing and self-help farmer
groups (iddir); and ownership of television or radio.
The means and standard deviations for the continuous variables and
the proportion of households with responses equal to 1 for the binary
variables are reported in Table 3. Given that the household character-
istics do not differ between each choice set, they were entered into the
regression models through interactions with the alternative specific
constants (status quo intercepts). Including these effects in the analysis
minimizes biases that would otherwise arise in the parameter estimates
of the main effects (the attributes).
Out of our sample 200 farmers that faced 8 choice-sets each invol-
ving a choice between two alternative PES contract options and the
status quo (see Table 2 for a sample choice set), we collected complete
responses on 194 farmers. Around 11 percent of the respondents (22
farmers) consistently opt against PES program regardless of the varying
attributes in the alternatives of the PES options and prefer the status
quo (mono-cropping farming system) in all their choices. Such a choice
behavior could be best explained by a bias towards the status quo (Dean
et al., 2017; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) which prevents farmers
from adopting climate-smart agroforestry. However, around 89 percent
of the respondents supported the PES program depending on the con-
tract attributes in the choice sets. This high level of preference towards
the PES contract implies that the choice sets offer plausible and salient
options to incentivize farmers to practice climate-smart agroforestry.
Table 4 reports mean difference tests on household characteristics
based on whether respondent farmers consistently opt against PES
contract (i.e. choose only the status quo) for the entire choice sets.4 The
averages show that sample households who consistently choose the
status quo are more likely to be female-headed, have smaller family
size, and are less likely to own TV or radio.
5.2. Generalized multinomial logit model results – farmer-specific
preference heterogeneities
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 present the parameter estimates for the
choice analysis under G-MNL uncorrelated and G-MNL correlated
models, respectively.5 The parameter estimates from the uncorrelated G-MNL (column 1) are used as starting values for the final G-MNL
correlated model. Post estimations following the correlated models of-
fers insight on preference heterogeneity, which is estimated as the de-
viations from the mean utility weights attached to the attributes. Since
the observations in the choice experiment are not independent, all
standard errors are cluster-robust at the household level.
For brevity, only the results from the correlated G-MNL model are
discussed. There are two main reasons for making this choice. First, in
addition to the significant presence of preference heterogeneity (i.e.,
Table 3
Household level characteristics.
Household characteristics Coding Percent Mean SD
Sex of the head 1 if Male; 0 otherwise 73
Age of the head Number of years 48.59 14.15
Family size Number of household
members
5.76 2.29
Landholding Total land size in hectare 0.92 0.94
Education status 1 if read and write; 0
otherwise
37
Extension contact 1 if Yes; 0 otherwise 77
Iddir membership 1 if Yes; 0 otherwise 61
Owns television or radio 1 if Yes; 0 otherwise 35
Note: SD stands for Standard Deviation.
Table 4
Mean differences in household characteristics based on choice behavior.
Household
characteristics
Choice decision (in favor of) Mean
difference
PES contract (at
least once)
No-PES contract
(always the status
quo)
Sex of the head 0.75 0.55 0.20**
Age of the head 48.20 51.64 −3.44
Family size 5.94 4.37 1.57***
Landholding 0.95 0.72 0.23
Education status 0.38 0.32 0.06
Extension contact 0.78 0.68 0.10
Iddir membership 0.63 0.46 0.17
Owns television or
radio
0.38 0.14 0.24**
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 5
Parameter estimates of the G-MNL model.
(1) (2)
Uncorrelated G-MNL Correlated G-MNL
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Payment amount 0.0154** 0.0138***
(0.0074) (0.0045)
Number of trees −0.0512** 0.1346*** −0.0408** 0.1846***
(0.0215) (0.0443) (0.0171) (0.0306)
Payment in food 3.5627* 6.9466** 1.8846*** 5.7263***
(1.8278) (2.8442) (0.4394) (0.9500)
Contract period −0.2263* 0.9517*** −0.1367** 0.5980***
(0.1294) (0.3568) (0.0580) (0.1122)
Taw ( ) −0.7263** −0.5875***
(0.3092) (0.1407)
ASC −0.7616 0.4801
(3.9333) (5.5422)
ASCXAge 0.0724 0.0440
(0.0593) (0.0914)
ASCXSex −3.2760* −2.8743
(1.7773) (4.7451)
ASCXEducation 1.8962 1.0666
(1.6168) (2.6228)
ASCXFamily size −0.2509 −0.2987
(0.2111) (0.5717)
ASCXLandholding −1.1483* −1.3111**
(0.6815) (0.6570)
ASCXExtension contact 0.7441 0.6704
(1.1498) (2.1210)
ASCXTvoradio −4.5662** −4.1057*
(2.2929) (2.2389)
ASCXIddir member −3.0362** −2.8475
(1.2859) (1.9463)
Observations 4656 4656
AIC 1702.64 1662.07
BIC 1812.22 1790.99
Log-likelihood −834.32 −811.04
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The standard deviations (SD) on the attributes capture preference heterogeneity
across farmers.
4 We thank the anonymous reviewers for pointing out that it would be in-
formative to assess whether respondents who consistently opted out of the PES
program have any different household characteristics.
5 The coefficients on the attributes, intercept and its interaction with house-
hold characteristics are estimated under the specification of Eq. (12) using Stata
15. The G-MNL model was estimated via simulated maximum likelihood using
the user-written Stata commands developed by Gu et al. (2013).
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the statistically significant standard deviations around the mean utility
weights on the attributes), the standard deviation of the respondent-
specific scale of the idiosyncratic error heterogeneity ( ) is highly sig-
nificant. These results signal the presence of preference and scale het-
erogeneities, and hence the G-MNL model is more appropriate than
MIXL model (parameter estimates are shown in Appendix Table A.1) as
it accounts for both types of heterogeneity. Second, goodness-of-fit tests
using log-likelihood (LL), Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Baye-
sian information criteria (BIC) show that the correlated G-MNL had the
best fit for the data than the uncorrelated G-MNL.
Table 5 column 2 shows that the coefficients on all attributes are
statistically significant, an indication of their relevance to the PES
program. As expected, the attribute “payment amount” has a positive
coefficient, an indication that farmers derive higher utility from higher
payment amounts. Farmers also demonstrate strong preferences for
food as a mode of payment than cash. Intuitively, cash might be
thought to dominate farmers’ choice since payments in cash give more
flexibility and expand the array expenditure choices. However, one
should closely scrutinize the contextual environment where farmers are
making their choices. The failure of output markets could explain
farmers’ preference towards payment in food rather than in cash. The
study area is characterized by its vulnerability to climate shocks and the
associated severe food shortage (Gebrehiwot and Veen, 2013). In the
absence of well-functioning markets that mobilize food items from
surplus to deficit areas, cash transfers are vulnerable to price increases
of food items thereby eroding the purchasing power of the transfers
(Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2010). Therefore, farmers would ra-
tionally choose the end good (food) rather than the means (cash). Si-
milar preference to receive food over cash was also observed among the
participants of a national safety net program (PSNP) in Ethiopia
(Devereux et al., 2006; Wiseman et al., 2010) because cash transfers are
not regularly adjusted to inflation rates (Baye et al., 2014).
The coefficients of “number of trees” and “contract period” are
negative indicating that, on average, farmers strongly prefer low
numbers of required planted trees and short-term contract periods.
These attributes positively influence farmers’ decisions to take-up
contractual tree planting practice. Loss aversion may prevent farmers
from adopting innovations with unknown returns (Fafchamps, 2009).
Since climate-smart agroforestry is not a common practice in the study
area, loss aversion is a plausible explanation for farmers’ reluctance to
fully commit their land and time to plant and maintain faidherbia albida
trees. Further analysis shows that except for the correlation between
payment in food and contract period, the non-diagonal terms in the
covariance matrix of the attributes are positive and statistically sig-
nificant (Table A.2 in the Appendix). Preference towards planting more
trees is positively and significantly associated with their preference for
food payments. Similarly, there is a positive and significant correlation
between the number of planted trees and contract period.
Turning to the interactions between household-level characteristics
and the ASC (choosing the status quo over PES options), the results
show that farmers with larger landholdings and those who own tele-
visions or radios strongly prefer the PES contract over the status quo.
The positive and significant effect of landholding on farmers’ choice to
enroll in a PES program is well documented in recent studies by Bremer
et al. (2014) in Ecuador and Lansing (2017) in Costa Rica.6 Landholding
is a key determinant of the household’s farm income generating capa-
city and a good proxy for the households’ wealth especially in agrarian
economies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). Consequently, farm income and
wealth are highly correlated with risk-taking behavior and patience of
the households (Tanaka et al., 2010). Hence, farmers with larger
landholdings are more willing to accept new practices with future
gains. There are two plausible explanations on the significant effect of
ownership of television or radio on farmers’ participation in the PES
program. One is acquiring these durable assets can also signal the
households’ wealth, and hence the above discussion still holds. The
other possible explanation is that as ownership of information media
these channels may determine access to information that could posi-
tively shape farmers’ knowledge and attitudes towards climate-smart
agroforestry and therefore affect their willingness to accept the PES
program. However, we are not aware of any national or local TV or
radio program specifically designed to promote agroforestry. Hence,
further research in this direction may reveal the practicality of our
suggestive explanation. Other demographic and socio-economic vari-
ables are not statistically significant predictors. For the variables sex of
the head and family size of the households, we observed statistically
significant mean differences between households who consistently opt
against the PES scheme and the remaining households (Table 4). After
conditioning on other household characteristics, the variations cease to
exist under our preferred model (Table 5 column(2)).
5.3. Willingness to accept measures
The WTA estimates – estimates of the marginal utility of receiving
payment – under both the preference and WTA spaces are presented in
Table 6. However, for the reasons presented in Section 4.4.2, we only
offer interpretations based on the WTA measures that are estimated in
the WTA space.7 Farmers are willing to receive around 59 ETB (2.60
USD) less in annual payment per timad, which is 0.25 hectare (ha) of
land, if the mode of payment is food rather than cash. Farmers are
willing to accept 1 ETB per timad (0.18 USD per ha) per year if they
have to plant an additional faidherbia albida tree on their farm plot.
Farmers are also willing to accept additional annual payment that
worth around 2 ETB per timad (0.35 USD per ha) for an increase in the
PES contract by a year.
5.4. Further insights from the latent class conditional logit model - class-
specific preference heterogeneities
The results from the LCL model offer insight into the variations in
the preferences across different segments of farmers by allowing the
attribute coefficients to vary across the (latent) classes.8 The selection
of the optimal number of latent classes was based on consistent Akaike
Information Criteria (CAIC) and BIC, which are more critical toward
models with more parameters by using penalty functions that increase
in the number of respondents. As shown in Table 7, CAIC and BIC are at
their lowest for five classes – types of farmers with different preferences
for PES contract attributes. The household characteristics (described in
Table 3) are used for predicting class membership to separate re-
spondents with different preferences for the attributes.
Table 8 reports the regression coefficients of the LCL model using 5
latent classes. The heterogeneity of preferences is reflected in the dif-
ferent parameter estimates for the attributes across the segments. The
mean (over respondents) highest posterior probability of class mem-
bership is about 0.95, which indicates that the model adequately dif-
ferentiates the underlying heterogeneity in preferences for the observed
choice behavior. While class 3 has the highest average membership
probability of 38%, class 5 has the lowest (12%).
Given that there are 3 alternatives in a given choice set, the (un)
conditional probability of actual choice examines the model’s ability to
make in-sample predictions of the actual choice outcomes (without)
conditioning on being in a given class c. The LCL model describes the
6 It should be noted that, especially in the context of landholding, farmers in
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa countries are quite distinct. Smallholder
farming on less than 2 ha of land is the major livelihood activity of rural
households in SSA in general and in Ethiopia in particular.
7 This study used a Stata code developed by Hole (2016).
8 The estimation is based on the Stata code developed by Pacifico and Yoo
(2013).
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observed choice behavior in each class with a significantly higher
average predicted probability of actual choice after conditioning on
respondents’ membership probability. For instance, the class 5 average
unconditional probability of choosing the actual alternative was 24%,
whereas this likelihood increased to 80% conditional on membership
probability.
Respondents in class 1 have statistically significant coefficients for
all the attributes, indicating that farmers in this segment care about all
of the PES program design features. Class 2 consists of a group of
farmers that derive higher utility from a PES program with a higher
payment amount and longer contract period. In this class, the re-
spondents’ utility weights attached to the number of planted trees and
payment in food are not statistically different from zero. Respondents in
class 3 exhibit strong preferences for a higher amount of payment in the
form of food (wheat). Class 4 comprises farmers whose preferences are
the exact opposite of those in class 3. Respondents in class 4 derive
higher utility by receiving a high amount of payment in the form of
cash.
Unlike the previous 4 classes, the payment amount coefficient for
respondents in class 5 is negative and significant at 1% probability
level. The coefficients for the remaining attributes in this class are not
statistically different from zero. This indicates that farmers in class 5 are
strongly against receiving payments from the PES program. Even
though there is no theory-based explanation for this result, an incident
that had occurred in the study area involving farming households and
coordinators of a cash transfer pilot program may provide a behavioral
explanation. In 2011, UNICEF Ethiopia launched a cash transfer pilot
program in Hintalo Wajirat district also targeting our sample tabias.
However, some households wrongly perceived that they were deliber-
ately targeted based on their religion and were being offered money to
change their faith. The implementation of the program was only rea-
lized after awareness meetings with the households to explain the real
intention of the cash transfers. Based on personal communication with
the cash transfer coordinator officer in the study area, the issue had
sporadically arisen until the official completion of the pilot program in
2014. Despite explaining the purpose of the PES payments in the ‘cheap
talk’ script of the DCE survey (stated under Appendix Fig. 2), our
finding may also point to the presence of a segment of farmers that
strongly oppose any payments with monetary value because of persis-
tent misconceptions on the intentions of the payments.9 The mean and
covariance of the attribute estimates after the LCL model are shown in
Appendix Table A.3.
Further analyses on variations in household characteristics of
farmers in the various classes are shown in Table 9. The household
characteristics across the segments of farmers are compared using the
Table 6
Willingness to accept measures in the preference and WTA space.
Preference space1 WTA space (in ETB)
Attributes Correlated G-MNL (in ETB)
Number of Trees 2.9494 0.9924***
(0.1735)
Payment in food −136.3085 −58.8229***
(2.3842)
Contract period 9.8840 1.8401***
(0.5493)
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01.
1 ETB is 0.044 USD based on the survey period average official exchange rate.
1 The ratio of the attribute coefficient to the negative of the coefficient for
the “payment amount” attribute from Table (5) column (2).
Table 7
Selection criteria for an optimal number of latent classes.
Classes LLF Number of parameters CAIC BIC
2 −1042.447 17 2191.88 2147.88
3 −830.6701 30 1850.139 1820.139
4 −786.1932 43 1842.999 1799.999
5 −743.2836 56 1838.992 1782.992
6 −730.5301 69 1895.298 1826.298
Table 8
Class-specific attribute coefficients in LCL model.
Attributes Class 1 Class2 Class3 Class4 Class5
Payment amount 0.0354***
(0.0051)
0.0103***
(0.0026)
0.0198**
(0.0091)
0.0228***
(0.0030)
−0.0339***
(0.0105)
Number of trees −0.1252***
(0.0262)
0.0204
(0.0130)
0.0087
(0.0254)
0.0157
(0.0162)
0.0079
(0.0620)
Payment in food 0.8887***
(0.2871)
0.2020
(0.1924)
4.5637***
(0.6538)
−1.9433***
(0.2507)
1.1645
(1.1598)
Contract period −0.3160***
(0.0695)
0.2146***
(0.0448)
−0.1938
(0.1385)
−0.0025
(0.0417)
−0.0979
(0.1891)
Class share 0.15 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.12
Unconditional prb. 0.50 0.47 0.60 0.37 0.24
Conditional prb. 0.65 0.60 0.96 0.72 0.80
Standard errors in parenthesis *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
Table 9
Variations in household characteristics between classes of farmers.
Household
characteristics
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5
Age 0.0009
(0.0232)
−0.0138
(0.0229)
−0.0141
(0.0181)
−0.0011
(0.0225)
Fixed
parameter
Sex 1.1969
(0.9141)
1.2743
(0.8227)
0.6186
(0.6698)
−0.1737
(0.7935)
Fixed
parameter
Education −0.3733
(0.7488)
−1.6915**
(0.8304)
−0.4958
(0.6206)
0.3218
(0.7210)
Fixed
parameter
Family size 0.1343
(0.1779)
−0.0105
(0.1642)
0.2196
(0.1415)
0.3303*
(0.1754)
Fixed
parameter
Total land 0.3764
(0.4218)
0.8804*
(0.4550)
0.0719
(0.4058)
−0.9940
(0.7442)
Fixed
parameter
Extension contact −0.2132
(0.7989)
18.4000
(311.567)
−0.4262
(0.6079)
−0.5110
(0.7292)
Fixed
parameter
Owns tv/radio 0.5791
(0.8796)
1.1834
(0.8048)
1.3811*
(0.7156)
1.8657**
(0.7936)
Fixed
parameter
Iddir membership 1.9776***
(0.7554)
0.8824
(0.6531)
0.8516
(0.5214)
−0.2513
(0.6290)
Fixed
parameter
Constant −2.8091*
(1.6813)
−18.9334
(311.5671)
−0.1010
(1.1843)
−0.7946
(1.4221)
Fixed
parameter
Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
9 We do not have prior knowledge about the incident during the survey or
data analysis. We learn about it while trying to provide a possible explanation
for the observed result.
K.K. Haile, et al. Ecosystem Services 39 (2019) 100964
9
5th class as a base category, where the household characteristics are
normalized to 0 for identification. Hence, we can compare the house-
hold characteristics of farmers in class 5 with farmers in the remaining
classes who have demonstrated a strong common desire towards higher
up-front payments. Accordingly, as measured by their membership to
an informal self-help farmer groups (iddir), farmers in class 5 are worse-
off in terms of their social capital than those in class 1. Farmers in class
5 have smaller landholdings but are more likely to be able to read and
write than households in class 2. Class 5 also comprises farmers that are
less likely to own TV or radio than those in class 3 and class 4. More-
over, farmers in class 5 have smaller family size than farmers in class 4.
6. Discussion
While conventional PES schemes reward agroforestry in developing
countries, the payments are made only after farmers provide the out-
puts (grown-up trees) that render ecosystem services. In the analogy of
conditional cash transfers, for example, assuming that households are
eligible for social assistance for their children schooling, the timing of
the transfers in a conventional PES design may mean poor and vul-
nerable households would only receive the transfers after their children
graduate from high school or college. On the contrary, the design of our
hypothetical PES scheme resembles an equity-oriented conditional cash
transfer in exchange for the initial farmers’ decision to plant fertilizer
trees (faidherbia albida) within their agricultural land. In this respect,
our PES design takes into account the fact that farmers in SSA are highly
financially constrained (Karlan et al., 2014) which makes them re-
luctant to invest in agricultural practices that do not result in immediate
cash inflows (Neufeldt et al., 2011). Respondent farmers in our study
exhibit a strong preference for the up-front PES payments in the form of
food. They also prefer higher annual payments for a few years than
small amounts that are made for many years.
Therefore, changing the timing of payment in a PES program may
trigger a change in behavior among farmers in SSA in favor of climate-
smart agroforestry, which has economic and ecosystem benefits. If a
PES program compensates farmers for the investment costs associated
with adopting climate-smart agroforestry at the initial years, when cash
outflows characterize the investment, farmers are willing to engage in
an environmentally conscious land use (planting trees) and there is a
high possibility for large-scale adoption of the innovation across the
landscapes of SSA. The current adoption rate in semi-arid and sub-
humid Ethiopia is 26 percent (Iiyama et al., 2017). Based on the design
features of our study’s PES scheme, almost 90 percent of sample re-
spondents welcome the idea of adopting the innovation.
It is also important to take into account that attributes of PES
schemes are not equally weighted by different segments of farmers that
are classified based on variations in their choice decisions and house-
hold characteristics. We observe that there is a class of farmers that are
firmly against receiving payments from a PES program. Moreover,
farmers in different classes also assign different utility weights to the
non-payment attributes. In general, our understanding of the household
and community contexts that farmers are operating and making deci-
sions is vital to develop outreach strategies for successful im-
plementation of agri-environmental policies such as PES interventions.
Income and wealth have been significant household characteristics
that influence households participation in a PES scheme (Bremer et al.,
2014; Lansing, 2017). Even in the context of smallholder farmers that
are characterized to operate on average landholding of smaller than
2 ha (Lowder et al., 2016) variables such as landholding and ownership
of durable assets that can proxy the households’ income and wealth
significantly affects their willingness to participate in a contractual
agroforestry practice under a PES scheme.
7. Concluding remarks
A DCE survey, which is constructed using a D-efficient design
procedure, was conducted on 200 smallholder farmers in Ethiopia to
estimate the utility weights they assign on various design features of a
hypothetical PES program that promotes the planting of fertilizer trees
on their agricultural land. The use of the G-MNL and LCL models allow
for farmer- and class-specific preferences, respectively. The results from
G-MNL model show that farmers derive higher utility from higher
amounts of up-front payments. Moreover, farmers prefer a PES program
that uses food (wheat) as payment, requires a low number of planted
trees and has a shorter contract period. Farmers are willing to receive
lower annual payments if the payments are in food rather than cash.
Conversely, farmers demand extra annual payments for the planting of
an additional fertilizer tree and extension of the PES contract by a year.
The results from LCL model show the presence of heterogeneity in
preferences across segments of farmers in conjunction with differences
in household characteristics.
The study also finds that households’ landholding and ownership of
a television or radio – which can serve as proxies for income and wealth
– positively influences their preference for the PES program. Ownership
of TV or radio may also proxy households’ access to information media.
Hence, the other suggestive explanation is that the mass media may
serve as channels for raising community awareness on climate-smart
agroforestry. Further research in this direction may reveal the practi-
cality of our suggestive explanation. The lack of effect of agricultural
extension services on farmers’ choice behavior is a red flag regarding
the emphasis given to agroforestry in the regional extension package.
There is, therefore, need to further investigate how fertilizer trees are
promoted by the extension service and if methods of promotion are
effective and need to be changed.
The study is a novel contribution to the PES literature as the design
of the PES program features payments starting from the initial year, as
opposed to conventional PES programs that pay after the ecosystem
services are realized. The study’s payment arrangement is suitable for
poor and vulnerable smallholder farmers as it rewards an en-
vironmentally conscious land use (planting trees) that has delayed
economic and ecosystem benefits. The results shed light on the design
considerations that must be taken into account for integrating efficiency
and equity objectives in PES programs that accommodate agroforestry
in the context of smallholder farming systems in SSA. The study reveals
the presence of farmer- and class-specific heterogeneous preferences on
the design features of the PES scheme. Hence, practitioners and policy
makers should develop strategies to increase outreach beyond the
average farmer to achieve successful implementation of environmental
policies that promote the large-scale uptake of climate-smart agri-
cultural innovations. Future field experiments based on the design
features of our DCE study will show the practicality of our findings.
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Appendix
Table A.1
Parameter estimates of the MIXL model.
(1) (2)
Uncorrelated MIXL Correlated MIXL
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Payment amount 0.0093*** 0.0094***
(0.0034) (0.0030)
Number of trees −0.0378*** 0.0992*** −0.0278* 0.1466***
(0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0228)
Payment in food 2.0757*** 4.7647*** 1.5569*** 4.5633***
(0.4015) (0.6178) (0.4228) (0.5832)
Contract period −0.1416*** 0.6044*** −0.0986** 0.4712***
(0.0453) (0.0799) (0.0497) (0.0647)
ASC −0.2541 0.4231
(2.1726) (2.7845)
ASCXAge 0.0415 0.0270
(0.0308) (0.0394)
ASCXSex −2.0110** −1.9021
(1.0088) (1.9938)
ASCXEducation 1.2148 0.8108
(0.8932) (1.3499)
ASCXFamily size −0.1974 −0.2762
(0.1822) (0.3130)
ASCXLandholding −0.7352 −0.7635
(0.4751) (0.4828)
ASCXExtension contact 0.4549 0.3852
(0.8664) (1.0697)
ASCXTvoradio −2.9163*** −2.9163**
(0.9070) (1.2075)
ASCXIddir member −2.0365*** −2.3367**
(0.7331) (0.9244)
(1) (2)
Uncorrelated MIXL Correlated MIXL
Observations 4656 4656
AIC 1704.95 1666.85
BIC 1808.09 1789.32
Log likelihood −836.48 −814.43
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The standard deviations (SD) on the attributes – preference heterogeneity across farmers.
The MIXL model was estimated via simulated maximum likelihood using the user-written Stata commands developed by Hole (2007).
Table A.2
Variance-covariance matrix of the attribute coefficients in the correlated G-MNL model.
Coefficients Number of trees Payment in food Contract period
Number of trees 0.0341***
(0.0113)
Payment in food 0.5899***
(0.1968)
32.7907***
(10.8806)
Contract period 0.0883***
(0.0319)
0.7869
(0.6979)
0.3576***
(0.1342)
Standard errors in parenthesis *** p < 0.01.
Table A.3
Preference heterogeneity described by mean and covariance of attributes after LCL model.
Coefficients Payment amount Number of trees Payment in food Contract period
Mean 0.0143 −0.0086 1.7460 −0.0977
Covariance Payment amount 0.0004
Number of trees −0.0004 0.0025
Payment in food 0.0026 0.0101 5.8699
Contract period −0.0010 0.0052 −0.2190 0.0295
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Note: The following “cheap talk” script was read to all sample farmers while presenting the above photos.
Now you are kindly requested to make choices between three alternatives. Suppose you are facing production decisions involving two alternatives where you
would be incentivized (in-cash or in-kind) for planting faidherbia albida trees on your agricultural land and a third alternative with an option to choose the
status quo (an alternative that you can say “I do not want to plant trees in my farm plots”). There are no “correct” or “wrong” choices but you have to make
priorities among the three alternatives and make only one choice in each choice set. Please be honest and reflect your choice as if it would be implemented right
now for real, i.e. either you would plant the number of faidherbia albida tree seedlings within your agricultural land in exchange for annual payments (in-cash
or in-kind) that will be made for a given number of years as specified in your choice or you would not plant the trees.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2019.100964.
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